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ABSTRACT
The Byzantine fault model is a worst-case assumption for faulty nodes in
distributed systems because it assumes faulty nodes to behave arbitrarily.
Previously, Lamport et al. proposed a replicated state way to solve the
Byzantine broadcast problem. But the original protocol is very expensive due
to large communication overhead. This thesis does a comparison study be-
tween practical Byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) and network coding based
algorithm (NCBA) which can solve Byzantine broadcast problem with lower
cost. I implemented a generalized testing framework as well as the Digest
protocol and the NCBA protocol. By the experiments I conducted, NCBA
has comparable performance compared to Digest in fault-free cases.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
This thesis explores the cost of Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocols.
Byzantine fault tolerance assumes arbitrary behavior of the server and thus
is a stronger fault model than the crash failure tolerance model. Lamport et
al. [1] proposed the replicated state machine approach to address the Byzan-
tine broadcast problem. Unfortunately, the original state machine approach
has a high communication overhead and thus it is not practical to implement
the original algorithm in real world distributed systems.
Later, all kinds of practical BFT protocols were designed to make Byzan-
tine fault tolerance practical, such as practical Byzantine fault tolerance
(PBFT) [2, 3], Q/U protocol [4], hybrid-quorum [5], Zyzzva [6], Aardvark
[7], network coding based algorithm (NCBA) [8] and ZZ [9].
In my thesis, I did a performance comparison between the PBFT protocol
[2, 3] and the NCBA protocol [8]. My results show that NCBA and PBFT
are comparable in fault-free cases.
The problem I target on is Byzantine broadcast problem. A single source
wants to broadcast a value to n-1 peers and meet the following requirements:
• Agreement
Correct peers will agree on a value.
• Validity
If the source is correct, correct peers will agree on the value the source
broadcasts.
• Liveness
The system is continuously making progress and will terminate.
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Also, I assume a synchronous communication network for the experiment.
In Chapter 2, I describe previous work on Byzantine fault tolerance proto-
cols. In Chapter 3, I present a system design to test existing Byzantine fault
tolerance protocols. In Chapter 4, I analyze the results of the performances
data. I state my conclusion in Chapter 5 and future work in Chapter 6.
2
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Byzantine Broadcast Problem
Lamport et al. proposed the Byzantine general problem [1] that n generals
propose their 1-bit proposals, “attack” or “retreat”, and all correct generals
need to agree on a single decision, “attack” or “retreat”, by voting. However,
a Byzantine-faulty general can vote different values to other generals which
makes correct generals collect inconsistent votes. For example, a faulty gen-
eral can vote “attack” to one general and vote “retreat” to another general.
In order to ensure that correct generals collect identical votes from all the
generals, a sub-routine called the Byzantine broadcast is needed to make
sure correct generals receive identical vote from a source even if the source
is Byzantine-faulty. The problem setting is the following: one source needs
to broadcast an L-bit value to n-1 other peers. If the source is fault-free, all
correct peers will know the L-bit value which the correct general broadcasts.
If the source is Byzantine-faulty, then all the correct peers need to agree on
some value.
Lamport et al. then proved that it is impossible to solve Byzantine broad-
cast problem for a system that greater than or equal to one third of its nodes
are compromised. For example, for a system of 1 source and 2 peers, a cor-
rect peer will not be able to differentiate whether the source is faulty or the
other peer is faulty. Then they also proposed a recursive algorithm to solve
this problem when the number of fault-free nodes is more than two thirds of
the number of nodes in the system. However, the recursive algorithm needs
O(2n) bits communication cost for agreeing on a single bit.
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2.2 Practical Byzantine Fault Tolerance (PBFT)
The major improvement in PBFT [2, 3] in respect to the classical algorithm
[1] is that PBFT compares the hash value of the original L-bit value from
each peer rather than using the original L-bit value itself. In this way PBFT
separates the Byzantine detection from actually agreeing upon the value it-
self and lower the communication cost to O(n) bits to agree on single bit
value in fault-free cases. Another benefit of using PBFT is that PBFT can
work with an asynchronous network, where Lamport et al.’s classical solution
only works for a synchronous network. However, because PBFT depends on
the collision resistant hash functions, PBFT is not an always-correct proto-
col due to hash collisions. More specifically, PBFT’s correctness depends on
the probability of hash collisions and whether the hackers can find a hash
collision. Better hash functions lead to higher computational cost in PBFT
and thus slow PBFT down to some extent. Implementation details will be
discussed in Chapter 3.
2.3 Network Coding Based Algorithm (NCBA)
Liang et al. [8] proposed NCBA protocol which uses network coding to
protect the L-bit value’s content. The source protects the value by Reed-
Solomon coding and creates different coded segments of the original L-bit
value. The source then sends different segments of the original L-bit value
to different peers. The peers then exchange what they get from the source
and determine whether the original L-bit value can be recovered or not. This
will introduce slightly more communication cost than PBFT but avoids using
hash functions. I will discuss my implementation and Benjamin’s implemen-
tation [8] in Chapter 3.
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CHAPTER 3
TESTING FRAMEWORK
3.1 Overview
Figure 3.1 is the software architecture of the testing framework. The test-
ing framework separates the communication layer, group membership from
the actual Byzantine broadcast protocols running on the framework. The
first motivation is that extending the functionality of the testing system is
easier so that future users can focus on writing clean protocol codes on the
framework without worrying about the detailed work about communication
and multi-threading. The second motivation is that measurements on all the
protocols are fair to each protocol because each experiment runs similar sets
of codes except for the protocol parts. Because of the above two reasons, the
framework has two parts. BFTNode is installed on each machine, regard-
less of source or peers, to ensure packets send and receive, send retry, task
scheduling, task management. BFTProtocol is an abstract class that follows
the usual multi-phase BFT broadcast algorithms, where each node starts at
some original state, some communications by packets delivering take place,
and then each correct peer sends a commit packet to the source. When the
source collects enough commits from the peers, the source knows that the
protocol ends. Any Byzantine broadcast protocols need to extend this ab-
stract class for the system to run it.
3.2 Terminology
• value
The original L-bit value is the value that all the correct peers need to
5
Figure 3.1: System Architecture
agree on after the protocol termination.
• packet
The communication in the system is through sending and receiving
packets.
• value id
The value id is the id for the L-bit value. It can be understood as the
id of each Byzantine broadcast.
• member id
The member id is distinct for each node in the system.
• task
A task is a class to handle all incoming packets for a single value id.
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3.3 BFTNode
3.3.1 Membership
BFTNode holds a mapping between ids to other machines’ IP address and
port numbers. So the communication is transparent to the protocols. All the
protocols know about the other machines only by their member id number.
The source will have the id of 0 and other machines will have ids starting
from 1. Each machine will have a distinct id. This mapping is retrieved from
a text file called “GroupList” in the file system, which is replicated in all
machines.
3.3.2 Scheduling and Synchronization
Every value the source wants the peers to Byzantine agree on has a dis-
tinct value id number. Here I assume that each L-bit value is independent of
each other and there is no causal relationship between different values, which
means value with value id = 2 can be agreed successfully before value with
value id = 1 is successfully agreed. This gives the system the ability to agree
in parallel on values that are not related to each other which will boost the
performance of the Byzantine fault tolerance protocol. A detailed discussion
of performance boosting is in Chapter 4.
Whenever a peer receives a new packet with a value id it has not seen be-
fore from the source or other peers, the peer generates a receiveTask locally
to handle all the following packets for agreeing on the L-bit value correspond-
ing to the unique value id. To ensure a task only process one packet at a
time, incoming packets for a single value id need to be serialized. A lock is
created for each task to serialize incoming packets for each unique value id.
Whenever the node receives a packet from other machines and the node has
the task to handle the packet, the node will generate a new thread to try to
grab the lock for that task. If the lock is successfully obtained, the node will
forward the packet to the task to handle it. If the lock cannot be acquired,
the thread will wait until the lock is freed.
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Figure 3.2: Handle incoming packets
In this way, a single task always handle one packet at a time and packets
with different value id numbers can still execute simultaneously.
3.3.3 Communication
Figure 3.2 demonstrate how a BFTNode handles incoming packets. The
framework uses Java’s TCP implementation to communicate. Each node
has a BFTListener which is a simple thread waiting for incoming packets.
BFTNode sends a packet by the target machine’s member id. A packet
should always have a value id number indicating which value this packet be-
longs to. Also a packet has a field indicating the choice of BFTProtocol it
wants to use and the member ids for the sender and the receiver. When a
BFTNode receives a packet, BFTNode forwards the packet to the task that
can handle this value id.
3.3.4 Measurement
Each protocol running on the testing framework needs to specify the ter-
mination of the protocol and thus the task will be removed from the node.
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When the source starts to Byzantine broadcast a value, he needs to create a
new value id number and a sendTask to handle incoming commit packets and
change of states for that value id. The sendTask will notify the BFTNode
whether they have completed after finishing processing each packet forwarded
to the sendTask. If all the sendTasks complete, the timespan for completing
all the tasks will be computed and a new set of experiments take place af-
terwards. Usually, in a measurement we needs a lot of similar experiments
to demonstrate protocol’s performance.
3.4 BFTProtocol
3.4.1 Overview
I implement the fault-free cases for Lamport et al.’s classical algorithm [1],
the PBFT protocol [2, 3] and the NCBA protocol [8]. I build an abstract
class to generalize those multi-phase Byzantine agreement protocols. Each
protocol needs to extend BFTsendTask class and BFTreceiveTask class to
add the BFT functionality. In this section, I will discuss the implementa-
tions of those protocols.
I assume the size of each value to be agreed on is L bits. The total number
of nodes is n and the maximum number of Byzantine faults is f.
3.4.2 Classical Algorithm
I implement Lamport et al.’s classical algorithm to do the Byzantine broad-
cast for n=4, f=1 in a synchronous network. It has three phases. In the first
phase, the source broadcasts the L-bit value to all the peers. In the second
phase when peers receive the value sent by the source, the peers do an all-
to-all communication to exchange what they receive from the source. In the
third phase, when they receive all the values from other peers, they agree
on the value by choosing the value appear the most frequently and send the
commit packet to the source. When the source receive f+1 commits from the
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peers, the protocol ends.
In the Lamport et al.’s algorithm, the first state broadcast needs 3L. The
value forwarding needs 3×2L = 6L. So in all, the communication complexity
is 3L + 6L = 9L.
3.4.3 Digest
Digest is a simple version of the PBFT protocol [2, 3] which I implemented
according to Liang et al.’s paper [8] for n=4, f=1. I use SHA-1 as the hash
function to generate the hash for the value. The protocol has 4 phases. In
the first phase, the source broadcasts the value to all peers. In the second
phase, when a peer receives the value sent by the source, the peer forwards a
prepare packet to other peers. The prepare packet has a random byte array
generated by this peer, and a hash value for the original L-bit value and the
random byte array combined. In this way, the peer only sends the random
byte array and the hash value but not the whole L-bit value to another peer.
In the third phase, when a peer receives a forwarded prepare packet from
another peer, it needs to verify the hash value is indeed the hash value of the
original L-bit value and the random byte array he received from the source.
In the commit phase, the peers Byzantine broadcast 1-bit flag indicating
whether they detect a Byzantine fault in the system using the Lamport et
al.’s classical Byzantine broadcast algorithm. If no node complains, the peer
sends the commit packet to the source. When the source receive f+1 commits
from the peers, the protocol ends.
In the Digest protocol, the first stage broadcast needs 3L. That is the
dominant communication complexity if we consider the hash value’s length
is far smaller than L bits.
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3.4.4 NCBA
The NCBA protocol [8] is very similar to the Digest protocol discussed above
except for the packet sent by the source and the way peers compare each
other’s forwarded packets. I implement the NCBA protocol for n=4, f=1.
Because f = 1, the Reed-Solomon code to ensure detecting Byzantine faults
can be simplied to a parity check [8]. Again, the NCBA protocol has 4
phases. In the first phase, the source encodes the original L-bit value to 4
segments, where 3 of the 4 segments are enough to decode the original L-bit
value. Here I just separate the original value into 3 segments where each
segment has L/3 bits and then compute the parity of the 3 segments to gen-
erate the 4th segments which is also L/3 bits long. It is obvious that any
3 segments in the 4 segments are enough to generate the whole L-bit value
by computing the parity. Then the source sends 1 segment of the original
value and the parity segment to each of the 3 peers in the system. In the
second phase, peers exchange the segments they uniquely received from the
source. In the third phase, after the peers receive all the segments from other
peers, the peers will be able to tell whether the value is indeed correct by
checking if the parity of the L-bit value still holds. The peers then Byzantine
broadcast 1-bit flag indicating whether they detect a Byzantine fault in the
system using the Lamport et al.’s classical Byzantine broadcast algorithm.
If no node complains, the peer sends the commit packet to the source. When
the source receive f+1 commits from the peers, the protocol ends.
In the NCBA protocol, the first stage broadcast needs 3 × 2/3L = 2L
because every peer needs two thirds of the value. In the second stage, where
all-to-all communication happens, it needs 3× 2× 1/3L = 2L because every
peer only forwards one third of the value to other two peers. So the overall
communication complexity is 2L + 2L = 4L.
3.5 Comparison with Previous Implementations
The major difference between the implementation in [8] and my work is that
my testing framework supports multiple Byzantine broadcasts in parallel.
The motivation behind this modification is that, for example, usually in a
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distributed file system, files are not causally related to each other and there
is no need to wait for the previous broadcast to terminate before starting
the next broadcast. In my design, each value id is the identifier for the value
and packets with different value ids can proceed in parallel without blocking
each other.
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CHAPTER 4
EVALUATION RESULTS
4.1 Environment
All the codes are first compiled into Java virtual machine binary code which
is highly optimized. All the nodes start their Java virtual machines to run
the framework and there is no disk I/O involved in the system. All the re-
sults are averages of 100 test runs.
In the experiment I conduct, I use 1 source and 3 peers. The source needs
to Byzantine broadcast to all the peers so that each correct source and peer
will have the exact the same value. The source is a Sumsung laptop running
Windows 8 on a 1.7 GHz Intel Core i5 and 8 GiB of RAM. The 3 peers
are Dell Inspiron 1545 laptops running Ubuntu 9.04 Jaunty, Gnome 2.26.1,
and Linux Kernel 2.6.28-11-generic on 2.9 GiB of RAM and a 2.0 GHz Intel
Core 2 Duo Processor T6400. The four machines are connected by a Netgear
GS108 gigabit switch.
4.2 Data
Peers agree on a single L-bit value sequentially, where L = 300 Bytes, 3 KB,
30 KB and 300 KB. The time span for agreeing on each value is measured is
in milliseconds.
L 300 Bytes 3 KB 30KB 300KB
Classic 11.09 12.17 19.69 157.69
Digest 17.81 19.63 21.22 106.39
NCBA 17.03 16.72 19.53 85.32
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Peers agree on two L-bit values in parallel, where L = 300 Bytes, 3 KB,
30 KB and 300 KB. The time span for agreeing on two values is measured is
in milliseconds.
L 300 Bytes 3 KB 30KB 300KB
Classic 14.07 15.47 32.34 317.23
Digest 28.36 25.86 31.87 182.52
NCBA 25.96 25.01 28.51 153.86
Savings by agreeing on 2 values in parallel can be computed by
1− the latency of agreeing on two L-bit values in parallel
2× the latency of agreeing on a single L-bit value . (4.1)
For example, for L = 30 KB and using NCBA, the savings of Byzantine agree-
ing on two values in parallel compared to agreeing on one value sequentially
is
1− 28.51
2× 19.53 = 27%. (4.2)
L 300 Bytes 3 KB 30KB 300KB
Classic 36.6% 36.5% 17.9% -0.59%
Digest 20.4% 34.2% 24.9% 14.2%
NCBA 23.8% 25.3% 27.0% 9.8%
4.3 Analysis
I measured the delay from when the source issues the Byzantine broadcast
to the time when the source receives enough commits packets from the peers.
The delay roughly depends on three different aspects of the protocol:
• The number of phases and average RTT (round trip time)
• Communication complexity
• Computation complexity
When the value size is small (less than or equal to 3KB), the dominant
factor in the delay is the number of phases of the algorithm. The classical
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algorithm outperforms both Digest and NCBA because it is only a 3-phase
protocol when f = 1 whereas both Digest and NCBA are 4-phase protocols in
fault-free cases. Agreeing on multiple values in parallel is very useful (around
30% more efficient) because most of the delay is caused by propagation delay
or in other words RTT. And parallelism boosts the performance of Byzantine
broadcast by using the idle time span when the machine is waiting for the
incoming packets to execute the Byzantine protocol for values of other value
ids.
When the value size is relatively large (greater than or equal to 300KB),
the dominant factors are communication complexity and computation com-
plexity. The classic algorithm’s performance is thus far behind both the
Digest protocol and the NCBA protocol. In my experience, NCBA is faster
than Digest. This is due to Reed-Solomon code can be quickly computed
for f =1 but one-way hash functions such as SHA-1 is still computational
intensive. Agreeing on multiple values in parallel is thus not very useful as
the value size grows larger because most of the delay is due to heavy compu-
tation or network complexities. If the machine’s CPU is heavily utilized or
the network bandwidth is heavily utilized, agreeing in parallel does not help
compared to agreeing on values sequentially.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
As can be seen from the results, NCBA’s performance is comparable to Di-
gest and sometimes even a little better than Digest. By not using the colli-
sion resistant hash function, NCBA saves a lot of computation cost on the
servers but introduces a slightly larger communication cost. Also, NCBA is
an always-correct protocol and does not use any cryptographic assumptions
on the Byzantine-faulty nodes, whereas PBFT relies on collision resistant
hash function to work correctly.
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CHAPTER 6
FUTURE WORK
We can see two trends of distributed system researches in this area. Crash
fault tolerance (CFT) systems are already been built with great performance,
such as BigTable [10], Cassandra [11], Dynamo [12]. The other trend is that
Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) protocols becomes quick [3, 5, 8], fault-
scalable [4, 6], costless [9, 13] and robust [7].
It is interesting to ask whether it is possible to build Byzantine fault tol-
erance as an add-on feature on current CFT systems and at the same time
minimize the additional cost for systems to switch from CFT to BFT. Up-
right [14] is designed to replicate a service to make it support Byzantine fault
tolerance.
In replicated systems, to ensure linearizability [15], often the system needs
each replica to process all the incoming requests in the same order. This
may require the system to use Byzantine fault tolerance protocol on the crit-
ical path to make sure all the correct replicas process incoming requests in
exactly the same order. Unfortunately, this will incur an extra overhead be-
cause BFT protocol’s overhead is larger than CFT’s.
To lower the overhead of replicated systems in Byzantine fault model,
we may want to let replicas temporarily process incoming requests with in-
consistent ordering, and try to fix the ordering later. This can be done in
read/write data objects [16, 17] by keeping enough versions of the data. We
have some preliminary thoughts on how to solve this problem in general cases.
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